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Motions of no confidence can negatively impact upon the
public’s view of the Government
Motions of no confidence are used sparingly in the UK, with their use tending to be reserved for moments of acute
political crisis for the Government, such as the resignation of Margaret Thatcher or the collapse of a cross-party
agreement. Here, Laron K. Williams and Zeynep Somer-Topcu draw on research from a recent article they co-
published in the European Journal of Political Research to show that while their practical use is primarily to bring
about elections and topple Governments, they also influence how the public see the Government in question, and
can be used by opposition parties to this end. 
The House of Commons (Credit: UK Parliament, CC BY NC SA 2.0)
In November 2013, the leader of Syriza, Alexis Tsipras, was given the perfect opportunity to publicly criticise the
coalition government’s austerity attempts by proposing a no-confidence motion (NCM).  “You have destroyed
society and society will no longer allow you to continue this destruction”, Tsipras declared, stating that austerity
policies have triggered a “social holocaust” (New York Times, 11 November 2013).  Although supported by some
other opposition parties in the parliament including the Communist Party and Golden Dawn, the motion failed to
achieve the needed 151 votes.  Its failure, however, was not a surprise as even Syriza did not quite expect it to
pass.
In addition to testing the strength of the governing coalition, the NCM fulfilled a second motivation—heightening
the public’s awareness of the coalition’s policies by criticising the government for increasing taxes on the poor and
using those taxes to protect the rich (The Guardian, 11 November 2013).
While those NCMs that pass understandably receive the most attention, opposition parties often propose NCMs to
weaken the governing parties’ images.  After all, only a small number of NCMs achieve the necessary votes to
force the governments to resign or to call for new parliamentary elections. Instead, opposition parties may use
NCMs, for instance, to highlight the government’s responsibility for a specific salient policy. The Liberals’ NCM
against Joe Clark’s Conservative Canadian government in 1979 concerning high energy prices was a good
example (Globe and Mail 1979). Opposition may also challenge the government with an NCM to try to elevate a
salient issue on the political agenda.
This was the intention for the NCM against Finland’s ‘rainbow coalition’ in March 1998. The centrist opposition
used the opportunity to highlight the plight of Finnish farmers in the face of EU policy (Agence France Presse,
1998). In addition, NCMs are often highly publicized opportunities for the opposition party to publicly question the
government’s ability or competence. Even NCMs with little chance of success receive front-page coverage. When
the British Labour Party proposed an NCM in 1991 over the Conservative Party’s decision not to abolish the poll
tax, it triggered a ‘bitter and rowdy debate that ended in uproar’ (Press Association, 1991). The circumstances of
the debate and the positions taken by the parties were widely reported in British newspapers such as the
Guardian and the Independent.
As these examples show, opposition parties often skillfully use NCMs to hurt governing parties’ competence
evaluations by voters. And, we know from widespread anecdotal and empirical evidence that citizens’ evaluations
of parties have substantial influence over the parties’ prospects for electoral success (Clark 2009, Clarke et al.
2009).   Indeed, merely proposing NCMs provides the opposition party that proposed it a meaningful gain at the
next election, often at the expense of the governing parties (Williams 2011). What we do not know is, on the other
hand, whether political parties use these NCMs and the critical environment they create to strategize about their
policy positions for electoral gains.
Political parties are motivated about winning votes and gaining office, a desire that partially drives both their
overall left-right positions and positions on particular issues.  How they change their positions, on the other hand,
depends on the information they receive about what will work and fail.
In the presence of an NCM, where the governing parties are attacked for their policy positions, opposition parties
should, then, strategically change their positions with respect to the government in order to successfully compete
for the votes that the governing parties are losing as a result of the NCM. We show in our forthcoming paper that
opposition parties move their positions away from the government’s position in order to disassociate themselves
from the failing government. This effect is especially pronounced when there are additional negative signals about
government performance.
After all, NCMs are targeted attacks by opposition parties. Even though they require a considerable amount of
prior organisation and may backfire against the proposer, they are proposed for the purpose of criticising
governments. As a result, we argue that both voters and political parties are more attentive to NCMs when there
are reinforcing negative signals about the government’s performance, such as weak economic performance or
scandals.  More simply, NCMs will matter more when they are coupled with poor policy performance.
We test these expectations on a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970 to 2007 using left-right positions
derived from election manifestos in combination with NCM and economic growth data.
Figure 1 shows our main finding. In this graph, the solid line represents the influence of an NCM on opposition
parties’ shifts either toward (positive values) or away from (negative values) the government’s left-right position,
across different values of economic growth (x-axis).  The shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval.
These results indicate that when economic growth is negative an NCM encourages opposition parties to
distinguish their own positions from those of the government by shifting away from their position.  Recall that our
theory applies to more than just economic performance, but to poor policy performance in general.  Indeed, we
also find that other indicators—such as scandals and international conflicts—magnify the “push” that NCMs exert
on opposition parties’ positions.
Figure 1: Marginal Effect of a No-Confidence Motion across Economic Growth (Main Model)
How does this theory apply to actual policy shifts?  An illustrative example for our results comes from Denmark.
Throughout 1974, Poul Hartling’s Liberal Democratic Party minority government in Denmark had relied on intense
negotiations with multiple opposition parties in order to remain in office. As economic growth declined and inflation
increased, the opposition increased its criticism of the government. At this time, the Communist Party reacted to
the government’s proposed budgetary cutbacks and income tax relief with an NCM which was supported by the
Progress Party.
The NCM was narrowly defeated, but it demonstrated to the public that the minority government would be unable
to implement the party’s economic priorities (i.e., reducing inflation, strengthening the kroner, providing income tax
relief, etc.) with the current Folketing membership. Hartling subsequently recommended parliamentary dissolution
and new election. Upon closer examination, we can see that the combination of negative economic growth (real
GDP per capita growth rate of -2.33% according to the Penn World Table), and a highly-publicized NCM
illustrating salient problems (balance of payments issues), provided the incentives for ideological shifts.
Figure 2 shows the left-right ideological change of each opposition party holding seats in the Folketing from the
election on December 4, 1973 to the election on January 9, 1975. The figure shows the partisan positions
established by these parties for the 1973 election (represented as a black dot), as well as the ideological change
at the next election (indicated by the direction and length of the arrow, with blue arrows indicating those parties
that moved toward the government).
As a reference, we also provide a vertical dotted line to show the government’s (i.e., Liberal Party’s) ideological
position in 1973. Of the 10 opposition parties in the Folketing, seven moved leftward and further away from the
government’s position. The magnitude of these shifts is quite large, as six of the seven parties moved more than
10 points away from their original position. These shifts are consistent with our theoretical expectations that
opposition parties move away from a government challenged by a NCM that also experiences poor economic
performance.
Figure 2: Illustrative Example of the Effects of No-Confidence Motions on Ideological Change across Two
Danish Elections: December 4, 1973 and January 9, 1975
Note: This figure shows the movement of each Danish party on the left-right scale (ranging from -40 for far left to
+40 for far right) from December 4, 1973 to January 9, 1975. The dashed line indicates the government’s position
in the 1973 election.
To sum up, our current research indicates that NCMs are not only tools for opposition to topple governments and
call for early elections. They can help negatively affect public opinion about governments, and through that, they
can assist opposition parties in their search for an electorally-advantageous policy position.
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